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TEPLOV AS A POPULARIZER OF
PHILOSOPHY
Grigorii Teplov was an important ﬁgure in eighteenth century Russia, partic-
ularly as an advisor in economic aﬀairs to Catherine II. Educated in the Academy
of Sciences and abroad he held some important positions: he was an assessor to
the Academy, an assistant of Kirill Razumovskii who was a hetman of the Ukraine,
and a head of the Commission on Commerce. As an academic, in 1751, Teplov
published his book, Knowledge related in general to philosophy: for the benefit of
those who cannot read foreign[-language] books on this subject. Teplov intended
to explain to a reader with little philosophical background what philosophy is
and what purpose it may serve. It was not intended as a textbook to be used in
schools (Z 59).1 He intended to do it in two volumes. The ﬁrst volume presents
some philosophical terminology and a brief history of philosophy. The second
volume was planned as a presentation of logic and logical reasoning, but it never
appeared.
As Teplov stated in his philosophy book, people should not be disheartened
by the fact that knowledge may appear to be of little, if any, use. All knowledge
is useful. If it is not useful or applicable today, it will be in the future, just as
1 References are made to the following works of Teplov: N – Наставление сыну, Санкт-
петербург: При Императорской Академии наук 1768. R – Разсуждение о врачебной науке,
Санкт-Петербург: [Типография Геннинга] 1784 [1774]. Z – Знания касающияся вообще до
философии: для пользы тех, которые о сей материи чужестранных книг читать не мо-
гут, Санктпетербург: При Императорской Академии наук 1751; most of the text is published
in М. В. Безобразова, Изследования, лекции, мелочи, Санкт-Петербург 1914, pp. 110–143;
most of the first and third part is published in Т. В. Артемьева, М. И. Микешин (eds.),
Философский век, no. 3: Христиан Вольф и русское вольфианство, Санкт-Петербург:
Санкт-Петербургский Центр Истории Идей 1998, pp. 207–289. A number after the slash, if
used, is the page number from Artem’eva’s anthology.
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past investigations turned out to be useful today, like studies of magnetism and
electricity (Z 38/214), which from being merely a curiosity and a subject of en-
tertainment grew to something extremely useful. Second, although researchers
investigate apparently useless phenomena, they discover along the way many use-
ful things, as it was the case with many useful chemical compounds found when
searching for the philosophical stone. Third, people can become famous because
of their apparently useless discoveries (43/215). Moreover, some inventions are
useless in separation, but become useful when they are put together (56/218). By
disregarding the third reason that appealed to vanity rather than to usefulness,
Teplov implicitly was a proponent of basic science which would not seek imme-
diate applicability but would expand knowledge and, possibly in the long run,
would lead to developments in technology.
The subject of philosophy
In the ﬁrst part of his philosophy book Teplov wanted to introduce the
reader to the subject of philosophy. To philosophize, according to Teplov, means
1. to know about the existence of things; 2. to know the causes of their existence;
and 3. to know the amount and strength of these causes (Z 67/221). This corre-
sponds to three levels of philosophical cognition, which Teplov adopted from the
preface of Tschirnhaus’ Medicina mentis et corporis (1695), where, for compari-
son, Tschirnhaus spoke about three levels of mathematics and philosophy. First
level mathematicians know mathematical divisions, meanings of words, and learn
by heart some main foundations of science, and philosophers of the ﬁrst level
know only philosophical divisions, the power of terms, and main philosophical
rules (70/223). Second level mathematicians know theories of Euclid, Archimedes,
and Apollonius, but they are not creative. Similarly, philosophers of the sec-
ond kind only know views of ancient and contemporary philosophers (71/224).
The third level mathematicians can solve some problems by the power of their rea-
son; similarly, philosophers of the third kind are creative (72/224). Accordingly,
following Christian Wolﬀ’s Philosophia rationalis (1728),2 Teplov distinguished
three types of cognition in philosophy: historical, philosophical, and mathemati-
cal (75/226). Historical cognition is simple information about things and events
without knowing their causes. Philosophical cognition included the knowledge
2 Wolff presented the three types of knowledge in the first chapter of the preliminary discourse
of his Philosophia rationalis sive logica (1728) entitled: “De triplici cognitione humana, historica,
philosophica et mathematica.”
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of causes. Mathematical cognition can quantify and measure causes (76/226).
In this way, Teplov spoke about factual knowledge acquired by observation and
experiments, the knowledge limited to gathering information possibly with spe-
cialized instruments (83/230); then there is qualitative, explanatory knowledge
that determines causal chains, and ﬁnally, there is knowledge that can quantify
causes thereby allowing us to apply mathematical tools in the explanatory pro-
cess. The knowledge of facts is the starting point for science, but for many people
it is also the end: they know facts without knowing their causes, whereby their
knowledge is really a belief (102/238). Knowledge of causes is more useful and
often gives people the upper hand over others; for instance, Columbus used the
solar eclipse to elicit food from gullible natives and even in 1715 William Whiston
had to explain to the superstitious English public that the solar eclipse is a natural
phenomenon (97/236). Examples of mathematical, i.e., quantitative knowledge
include determining the thickness of ice on a river to go across it (112/243), an
estimation of the power of a canon-ball and of the power of water when building
a fountain (116/245). One type of such knowledge shows the course or the trend
of natural phenomena; another type determines the strength of causes (118/246).
In another deﬁnition, Teplov stated that “philosophy is a science in which
we get to know unknown [things] through our reason and through conclusions
[derived] from known things” (Z 122/248). It has two parts: 1. methods of de-
riving knowledge about what is unknown from what is known; and 2. the body
of knowledge determined by these methods. Conclusions are derived with logic
which is the key to philosophy (124/249). How can the known be derived from
the unknown? Through an application of the rules of logic to observational data
to establish causes of various phenomena. In this way, Teplov turned philoso-
phy into the methodology of science and thus he could say that it is possible to
philosophize about everything, i.e., to look for causes (132/252). For example,
jurisprudence, medicine, and rhetoric should be ﬁlled with philosophical cognition
(133/253); that is, they should base their speciﬁc body of knowledge on estab-
lishing causal relations between phenomena in their domain of interest. And so,
“the ﬁrst duty of Philosophy is to reason about what is and what can be. All
this because of which something happens is the cause of existence” (126/250).
However, because experiments or physical experience constitute the ﬁrst and the
best level of philosophy (149/260), Teplov seems to have limited philosophy to
philosophy of science, to the method of searching for causes that, ideally, could
be quantiﬁed. The human mind is not, however, all-powerful: there are causes
that are inaccessible to human reason and God did not give humans the ability
to know them rationally – they can be known only through revelation (107/241).
An extended example of Teplov’s belief in the superiority of causal knowledge
is his attack on contemporary medicine, A treatise on medical science.
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Russians until recently lived without educated doctors and yet they lived
for 100 years (R 4). When I stop eating what I like, grumbled Teplov, because
doctors prohibit it, I suﬀer from two illnesses instead of one (5). I better be eating
what I like with moderation. The best medicine is letting an illness to take its
natural course; nature will take care of it since “it better understands its duties
than medical science. Nature knows itself and sees everything in itself; it does
not slumber but is active; however, the learned healers know nothing, they only
console a sick man with their talk” (6). If one doctor prohibits some drinks (10),
the patient should call another doctor who will permit them. We believe doctors
because of our suﬀering and our fear of death (11). Before a doctor tries to help
a sick, he should know the sick’s kind of illness, anatomy, temperament, habits,
inclinations, habits, thoughts, and imagination; then, all this should be connected
to the nature of a particular place, air, season, conﬁguration of celestial bodies and
their inﬂuence on the body (12). Maybe Teplov went too far with calling on the
knowledge of conﬁguration of celestial bodies, but he surely advocated a holistic
medicine: the more a doctor knows about a patient and his surroundings, the
better medical help he can oﬀer. The doctor should also know the development,
i.e., stages of an illness, and power of herbs he wants to apply (13). Teplov said
he was not criticizing doctors personally, but their craft (14), their craft, that
is, which relied on anecdotal observations with very little, if any, insights into
causes of medical predicaments of patients. Because of random, disconnected
observations, the same thing is considered medicine by some doctors, poison by
others (21). The same water which helps some patients can be bad for others;
even for the same person it can be good at one time and bad at another time,
as Teplov himself experienced with water from mineral springs in Wiesbaden.
A success of a medicine in some cases does not guarantee that it will always be
good for everyone (22).
History of philosophy
The second part of Teplov’s philosophy book, which is about a third of the
text, is a brief history of philosophy that he divided into barbarian philosophy
(philosophy of Asiatic nations and of the Jews), Greek philosophy, and Middle
Age along with contemporary philosophy.
Most attention among barbarian philosophy Teplov devoted to the Jews. In
his view, they were the ﬁrst to occupy themselves with wise philosophy. The
Bible does contain knowledge useful for daily life and for afterlife by teaching
about the true God and God-pleasing morals, but not about physical, i.e., sci-
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entiﬁc knowledge. Some scholars claimed that physical sciences were developed
among the Jews and even that Moses espoused the Copernican system (Z 154),
but, said Teplov, other nations held then Jewish physical knowledge in low esteem.
Therefore, it should not be claimed that knowledge of Pythagoras and Plato had
come from the Jews (155) and that physical knowledge was there before the fall of
Jerusalem. However, when the Jews returned from the Babylonian captivity, they
were inﬂuenced by Greek philosophy. Josephus wrote that Pharisees were Stoics,
Sadducees Epicureans, Essenes Pythagoreans (156). Teplov also discussed Kab-
balah, really a Pythagorean and Platonic system with some superstition added
to it (156, 159). Kabbalists make many claims that are contrary to Christianity,
but this is “an absurd argument!” (157) and their games with words and numeri-
cal values of letters serve as an entertainment of only a few people (161). Jews got
their knowledge from Egyptians, not vice versa, cf. Acts 7:22 (162) about Moses
who learned from Egyptians. As the Scriptures testify, Jews had true knowledge
about God and God-pleasing morality. Egyptians did not possess this knowledge;
however, they knew mathematics and geometry (163).
Barbarian philosophy includes philosophy of the Chaldeans, whose major
philosopher was Zoroaster (Z 165). In Teplov’s view, they believed that the world
was eternal, that it was a god, and they believed in “other similar nonsense.” From
Chaldeans, philosophy came to Persians; their major philosopher was Zoroaster
claimed to be diﬀerent form Chaldean Zoroaster (166). “On theology they did
not say except for nonsense.” 300 years after Christ, in Persia emerged heretical
Manicheism (167) originated by Mani; “it is frightful to even mention his here-
sies” (168). These are simply absurd teachings. The pope Leo said that the devil
set his throne in Mani. In Teplov’s words, “all that is lawless among pagans,
carnal among Jews, prohibited and mysterious among wizards, and blasphemous
among heretics, stems from Mani like from a stinking vessel” (170). Then Teplov
mentioned Arabs and the fact that their wizards were skilled in medicine (171).
In Matt. 2:1, Arab wise men are mentioned, not Persian magi, since Jews called
Arabs an Eastern nation (Judges 6:3 [actually, “the sons of the East,” οἱ υἱοὶ
ἀνατολῶν]) (172). Then, Teplov mentioned Hindu Brahmans and their belief that
they return after death to the whole, i.e., to the divinity. The Chinese had similar
beliefs (175), but in morals they followed Confucius and even today many of his
teachings have many “mindless followers” (176).
Greek philosophy in Teplov’s view was superior to any barbarian philosophy,
and Greek philosophers always followed the truth or at least they tried to. Poetic
philosophy is the oldest (Z 177). Among major Greek philosophers, Teplov men-
tioned Pythagoras (178), whom he commended for his scientiﬁc work, although
Pythagoras “raved about Harmony” (181); “all that is incorporeal, he called in
Latin Ens” [sic] (182). There are many other views ascribed to him, but “all of
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them are even more ﬁlled with empty tales.” There is a mention of Thales, Anax-
imander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Archelaus (183). They were not godless
since they recognized a deity (184). Tales made “a laughable observation” that
ﬂoods of the Nile are due to Ephesian winds. “Anaxagoras, although he was
considered wiser than others, babbled so much that today a young man who has
only some knowledge of Physics cannot without laughing read his Philosophical
statements.” Then Socrates is mentioned (185) who spoke about providential
God the Creator and the immortality of the soul. By saying that the soul ex-
ists before the existence of the body, he accepted the Pythagorean fable (187).
About Plato the reader learns that he believed in the existence of materia prima
that was molded by God (192). To that end, God created “ﬁrst models for all
things” (193), which is the only mention of the Platonic world of ideas/forms.
About Aristotle’s philosophy Teplov only said that all knowledge comes from the
senses; in reasoning, people go from a cause to an eﬀect (198) and use syllogistic
logic for proper reasoning (199). Some attention was devoted to the Cynics and
Antisthenes, “a shameless and crude man” (206). They based their philosophy on
freedom, but “this foundation is very weak since nothing else stems from freedom
but vices. The more man acts according to his will, the more vices can be expected
of him” (208). It follows a brief mention of the Stoics (209), Eleatics (212), Dem-
ocritus, Epicurus, and their philosophia corpuscularis (213). Epicurus rejected
immortality of the soul, divine providence, and the fear of God and so, “there
is no encouragement [in his philosophy] for a virtuous life,” as testiﬁed by the
life of pleasure of the Epicureans: “absurd and useless teaching!” (216). Then,
there were the eclectics, by whom Teplov understood Neoplatonists and Neopy-
thagoreans. Finally, “just as any fable is nothing without a laugh, so in Greek
Philosophy ... there was a peculiar ridiculous sect called the Sceptics” (219).
So, in Teplov’s mind, the, basically, laughable story of Greek philosophy ends on
a particularly ridiculous note.
Medieval philosophy was inﬂuenced by Aristotle (Z 221), particularly scholas-
ticism. By their “irrational curiosity and a method that was ridiculous to any ra-
tional man, [the scholastics] brought upon themselves extreme disdain and ridicule
in [respect to their] learning and in teaching. In particular, because in all their
stupidity their thought so highly about their teachings, they were not ashamed
to consider themselves high-minded and marvelous.”3 They ﬁlled philosophy
3 In a similar vein, Teplov criticized some schools improperly, in his view, called academies
because they teach Latin and “old scholastic Aristotelian traditions,” Григ[орий] Н. Теплов,
Проект к учреждению университета Батуринскаго, 1760 года, Чтения в Императорском
обществе истории и древностей российских при Московском университете 1863, bk. 2,
p. 67.
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with “countless errors” (222). They used obscure terminology of which even to-
day Jesuits are proud. Rejection of Aristotle’s philosophy was undertaken in
the ﬁfteenth and sixteenth centuries by such writers as Valla (223), Ramus, and
Gassendi (224). Development of science contributed to the decline of Aristotle,
by which Teplov meant the work of Lullus, Ramus (225), Cardano, and Cam-
panella (226). Then, only the names of Francis Bacon, Leibniz, and Newton
were mentioned (228) followed by a discussion of Descartes (229). Descartes be-
lieved that one statement is without a doubt, “I am, I think” (230, 231), which is
Teplov’s rather inadequate rendering of the famous cogito ergo sum. Teplov was
apparently impressed by the Cartesian proof of the existence of God, basically, an
ontological proof, which Teplov discussed in some detail (232–234). Descartes was
the ﬁrst to free philosophy from the Aristotelian yoke. Spinoza and his heresies
are also mentioned, but nothing is said about his views (235). Among modern
thinkers, Teplov only mentioned Paracelsus, Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf and
their social theories (236).
From about a hundred pages presenting the history of philosophy, the reader
does not learn much from Teplov. He listed many names without discussing their
views. His presentation is based on secondary sources, primarily, encyclopedia
and lexica entries, with no references to original works of philosophers Teplov
discussed indicating his at best superﬁcial familiarity with the history of philoso-
phy. And thus, his discussion is inadequate and sometimes even erroneous. The
central point of Platonism, the existence of the world of ideas, is only tangentially
mentioned. Also, Plato’s Demiurge did not create the models he used to mold the
world; they were co-eternal with him. Teplov said much more about Aristotle’s
life and about the fate of his books than about his philosophy. The concept of
causality so important for Teplov is only mentioned and Aristotle’s four types of
causes are not mentioned at all. Only mention is made about the Eleatcs, with
no discussion of their particularly interesting and paradoxical views. Also, they
are mentioned after Aristotle, and so was Democritus, although they were Pre-
socratic philosophers. Presentation is highly opinionated; views disagreeable to
Teplov are described as irrational and absurd.4 Scholasticism was only berated,
but the reader never learns what was so contemptible in this philosophy. In the
mind of an Orthodox believer it was enough that it was a philosophy accepted
in the Catholic church to reject it and the curious association of scholasticism
with the Jesuits would make it in the mind of a likeminded Orthodox reader
particularly oﬀ-putting.
4 Teplov “sometimes judges [views of philosophers] very harshly,” Безобразова, op. cit., p. 118.
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Philosophical concepts
In the ﬁrst part of his philosophy book, Teplov concentrated on philosophy
and methodology of science. In the second part, he showed a very casual ac-
quaintance with the history of philosophy and what was important for particular
philosophers brushing impatiently aside many philosophical issues with insults
or simply not mentioning them at all. In the third, the shortest part, Teplov
redeemed himself to a moderate extent as a philosopher brieﬂy discussing some
ontological and epistemological problems when presenting a series of philosophi-
cal concepts. Without acknowledging it, Teplov based his discussion on Wolﬀ’s
Philosophia prima sive ontologia (1730); the titles of eight sections in this part
largely repeat chapter titles from Wolﬀ’s book.
Teplov said that the essence makes a being what it is (Z 250/266). Essences
of beings are immutable (251/266) and eternal (252/267). Each being has its
speciﬁc perfections (254/268). Substance is when all parts together give an en-
tity its full being (256/268). A property/attribute cannot be separated from
a body (e.g., its weight); an accident (e.g., its position) can (258/269). Relation
occurs when two thoughts are compared (260/270). The concept of nothing-
ness is introduced (261/271) along with the concept of privation as an absence of
a property needed for perfection of an object (263/272). Potential beings are men-
tioned (266/273) and so are impossible beings, e.g., a square with three angles,
considered to be nothingness (267/273). An entity can be potential, but circum-
stances can make it impossible; there are physical impossibilities (269/274) and
moral impossibilities, e.g., a man does not jump into ﬁre, although this is physi-
cally possible (270/275). Many philosophers say that necessary is that of which
a contrary is impossible (271/275). On the other hand, accidental is what can be
and can not be (274/277). “What is morally possible, is accidental.” If a person
can do something, he does it according to his will. “If he did something, it was
done by the determination of his reason and thus such accident should be called
necessity since such an act [was] performed according to one’s inclinations that
stem solely from the will of a man corrupted by sin” (275/277). As to the con-
cept of duration, the reader learns that everything comes to an end, except for
the Creator. Duration is associated with the concept of time (277/278): there
is a succession of states in man (279/279), but there is no succession in God’s
attributes, in whom “all that was, what is and what will be remains in its order
without succession” (280/279). In God’s mind all things are perfect and always
the same. We only see temporal manifestation of these things and their temporal
succession which in itself – presumably, in God’s mind – is not a succession; we
see a real thing only through changes in time (281/280). If an object changes, it
is never the same (284/281). There is a diﬀerence between being the same (тот
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же) and being similar (такой же) (287/282). God can annihilate an object and
recreate it: it would be the same object since it is made out of the same particles
conﬁgured in the same order (288/283). Identity can be preserved by retaining
identity of structure; e.g., when all parts of a machine are replaces by new parts,
it is the same machine if it works the same way (289/283). Similarly, the hu-
man body, “although it changes, it remains always the same, but according to
Philosophy they cannot be called simply the same, since some of their properties
changed from the previous [properties]” (290/284). As to the problem of cause
and eﬀect (292/285), Teplov took it for granted that by knowing God and His law
we should accept the principle that there is no causal chain going inﬁnitely into
the past (297/287). Nature has a beginning in God as its ﬁrst cause (298/288).
The third part of his philosophy book is the most philosophical and somewhat
curiously creates a disharmony with the preceding parts. The ﬁrst part focuses
on science with its examples and narrow discussion of philosophy. The third
part moves to the realm of ontology – if only following Wolﬀ – which is rather
unexpected after reading part one with its narrow understanding of philosophy
and part two with its contemptuous attitude to large philosophical themes raised
throughout the ages. This surely can leave the reader confused, particularly the
one who is new to philosophy, the reader intended by Teplov.
Theology
The last remarks in the third part of Teplov’s philosophy book indicate
that his presentation of philosophical issues was intertwined with theological ob-
servations. In his view, “natural theological cognition is no small part of sci-
ence/teaching that belongs to Philosophy” (Z 248/265); in fact, “theology as
its ﬁrst part determines eternity and creates satisfaction for temporal happi-
ness” (26/212). That is, theology lays solid foundations for philosophy by de-
lineating the inﬁnite properties of God the Creator of the universe. Theology also
is a basis of human happiness by infusing meaningfulness into temporal earthly
existence that is guided by the providential God.
God’s reason is inﬁnite. “There is nothing past in Him, there is also nothing
future in Him. Our Creator cannot be informed about anything, He knows and
predicts what follows from what” (Z 280/280). God “is always one, always perfect,
always satisﬁed of Himself and always the same” (281/280). God is His own cause;
He is eternal, He guides the universe with His reason (259/270). All things that
exist come from the Creator God who was not created and is eternal (247/250)
and by creating the world, the Creator determined the laws of nature (118/246).
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Nature “is created by God in such perfection that it does not need any correction
from conjectural science. Its order with which it rules ﬂeas or underground moles
serves also humankind” (R 32).
Many theologians would agree with such representations of God, but Teplov
was an Orthodox believer and did not doubt in the superiority of the Orthodox
Christianity over any other religious faiths. Many pagans, he said, had other
philosophical principles than people who knew God, His law and revelation. More
speciﬁcally, “those who did not know God and Christian teaching always based
their philosophy on other principles than we did” (240/263); as a wise man once
said, “there is nothing that can be raved about in fever that Philosophers did
say up until now” (241/263). This is a reason for which Teplov not only did not
appreciate many philosophical views of the past but treated them with an open
contempt.
The truths of theology are not only a matter of faith. There are some truths
that are inaccessible to human reason and are known through revelation. How-
ever, human reason should also be applied in theology, if possible. In particular,
although the Orthodox tradition is much less interested in proofs of the exis-
tence of God than the Western church, Teplov advocated the use of such proofs
as a way of combatting atheism. In a conversation with Fonvizin who was at
the height of his religious investigations, Teplov recommended one book, Samuel
Clarke’s A demonstration of the being and attributes of God (1705) since “he wrote
against Hobbes, Spinoza, and their followers. Clarke triumphed over them: by
logically deriving one truth from another he created, so to speak, unbreakable
chain of proofs of the existence of God and not one godless man will wriggle
out by his arguments from his persuasive reasoning.”5 This persuasive reasoning
was based on the assumption that the existence of “endless progression is so very
absurd” (Clarke, proposition 2), which was a basic assumption in the scholastic
proofs of the existence of God. In fact, Teplov’s concentration on God’s inﬁnity
and eternity bears marks of Clarke’s reasoning. Interestingly, Clarke spoke about
God’s self-existence of the Original Independent Cause whose reason of existence
comes “neither from within itself not from without,” and yet Teplov spoke about
God being His own cause (Z 259/270), in which apparently he took a cue from
the concept of ens a se, a concept used by the scholasticism he so berated.
Teplov spoke about God with reverence and sincere conviction; however, he
spoke about Him in rather general terms. He never mentioned the Trinity and
5 Денис И. Фонвизин, Собрание сочинений, Мосва: Государственное Издательство Ху-
дожественной Литературы 1959, vol. 2, p. 103. Conversations took place in Tsarskoe Selo,
possibly in 1766 or 1768, П.А. Ефремов, Примечания, in: Денис И. Фон-Визин, Сочинения,
письма и избранные переводы, Санкт-Петербург: П.И. Глазунов 1866, p. 668.
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Christ (except when saying that something took place in a particular year before
Christ), and if occasionally he did not refer to Orthodoxy or to Christianity, it
would not be easy to say whether he was an Orthodox believer.
How important religion was in his own life, may not be easy to assess. How-
ever, he was appointed a member of the Spiritual Committee (1762–1763) which
worked on the problem of secularization of church property. Peter I abolished in
the Spiritual regulation the patriarchate and replaced it by the Synod that was
answering to him. Catherine II carried the submission of the church even further
by taking away its property – and Teplov was in the midst of it. As a pupil of
Prokopovich, an ecclesiastic who actually wrote the Spiritual regulation, Teplov
sided with his former teacher in respect to submission of the church to the state
authority. The fact that he believed in it can be seen in his proposal of the
Baturin university (which was never implemented), in which he stated that the
villages and property of the Baturin monastery could be used by the university.6
The church did not quite protest against Catherine’s reforms. One exception was
Arsenii Matseevich who paid for it with his imprisonment and death in prison.
Interestingly, Matseevich is said to have made some prophecies about those in-
volved in the demise of the church. It is said that one prophecy was about Teplov’s
death. As a newspaper reported after Teplov’s death, “for three days he could not
speak and suﬀered terribly, after which he started to speak opening [his heart]
before the priest and before all [present people]: ‘I didn’t respect the Church,
nor God and disrespected His temple, I perish here; but you, dear sirs listening
[to me], seeing such agonizing end of mine, repent and be virtuous. I didn’t do
anything good to anyone in my life, for which I am getting a payment.”7 This
confession would make credible a statement that Teplov’s inclination was toward
“evident deism.”8
Education
Both theology and philosophy has a direct inﬂuence on human life, in par-
ticular, on proper upbringing of children by parents and the pupils by teach-
ers. “Christian theology is the best Philosophy for human education since basic
6 Теплов, Проект, p. 71.
7 Санкт-Петербургсие ведомости 30 May 1779, quoted in Диомид (Дзюбан), Митропо-
лит Арсений (Мацеевич): историко-религиозный очерк, Москва: Зеркало 2001, p. 132.
8 Светлана В. Шлейтере, Философия Г.Н. Теплова, Москва: Московский государствен-
ный университет имени М.В. Ломоносова 1996, p. 13.
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(прямая) Philosophy teaches nothing else but how to lead from superstition rea-
son imperfect by nature, [reason] frequently led away by upbringing to extreme
error” (Z 25–26/211).
Teplov wrote a little book for his 14-year old son, Aleksei, from his second
marriage, Instruction for my son. Not particularly trusting the human nature,
Teplov opened his advices with a remark that his son stands before the door of
error and all his impulses and inclination will lead him astray if he does not give his
hand to his father to be guided (N 4/203). This hand will show him the straight
path leading to the goal for which he had been born (4). “You are brought up
in the ways of Orthodox faith, in which you were born and foundations of which
were instilled in you from the early childhood. You’ll be more educated by it
when the powers of your natural reason will solidify.” Thus, all the educational
principles should be given under the overarching guidance of Orthodoxy. And
so, Teplov intended to give his son some rules addressing the major powers of
the inclinations of his soul (5), the rules which should lead him from boyhood
to youth and then to old age (6). There are 21 rules and the rest of the book
enumerates them with some accompanying comments. Here are these rules.
1. “Be goodhearted”: “the ﬁrst and major happiness in the human life is sin-
cere heart” (N 7/203). Such a person can empathize with someone’s misfortune.
He sees goodness in people and passes over their faults and weaknesses (8/204).
He reconciles people, wishes others well, does not envy anyone (9/204). 2. “Beware
of taking advantage of someone’s misfortune” notwithstanding the sad fact that
everyone seeks a beneﬁt from his actions and if someone does not do it, he is con-
sidered a simpleton (11/204). 3. “Be economical/frugal, but not stingy” (15/204).
4. “Generosity without pride is a double gift”: the rich can give, but not everyone
knows how to give; only grateful people do (21). Some give to express their pride;
some are prompted to give by their position but exhibit their dissatisfaction (22).
A pure and grateful soul does not give for show (23). True generosity occurs
when the giver and the receiver experience full satisfaction (25). 5. “Overcome
poverty with work and diligence” (27/205), as a Roman author said, as Teplov
rendered it in rhyme, “the gods sell all for labor and help those who labor.”9
6. “In fortune and misfortune look to your future years” (30/206): remember
that in good times misfortune can strike and in a misfortune can good times ar-
rive (31/206). 7. “Be brave, but don’t be a bully” (32/206). 8. “Never allow for
bad habits to settle” (35/206). People are not born with stinginess, greed, and
cruelty, which are the results of upbringing, so suppress them when their signs
appear in your life (39/207). 9. “Don’t be foolish in the passion of love”: love is
9 It was, in fact, a Greek author, Epicharmus, who said, the gods sell us all good things for
our work (Xenophon, Mem., 2.1.20).
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the most pleasant and yet the most foolish passion to the extent that the ancient
not being enlightened by faith made a divinity out of love (41). It often makes
the impossible possible, makes a coward a brave man, a miser a generous man,
a proud man humble, but it also makes a reasonable man a fool (42). 10. “You’ll
have reputation like those with whom you keep company” (43); therefore, seek
the company of older, experienced people, but they will accept you only if you are
virtuous and sincere (44). 11. “Consider your health to be your most important
treasure” (48/207). People do their best to become ill: they eat when they are
not hungry, they are up all night without any need, overheat themselves although
it is not cold, sit without motion or exert themselves when moving (49/207).
Therefore, moderation in life is necessary, which is helped by properly keeping
a daily schedule (51/208). 12. “Do not play [cards], because you can lose or
even destroy yourself” (53). 13. “What will become of you when you lose your
possessions!” When being rich you’ll lose your possessions, you’ll become dead
to people (58). Then you’ll see who are your true friends and those whom you
trusted too much (61). In such times you have to remember that God is your
only helper and benefactor (64). 14. “Try to speak to the point and thought-
fully” (65/208). Don’t say everything you know; say only what is ﬁtting the
subject at hand. “Reason without knowledge is nothing, but knowledge without
judicious use is ridiculous” (68/208). 15. “Distinguish true friendship from famil-
iarity” (69). “Sympathy creates friendship, honesty feeds it, and sincere heart (70)
protects it forever, but familiarity quickly undermines all of it and friends do not
recognize one another.” Familiarity is a mother that brings along its (71) older
daughter, contempt (72). 16. “Do not get used to mocking [people]”; “everything
can be learned, but no one learns how to mock, one has to have for it a spe-
cial natural talent” (73). If you want to joke about someone, do it judiciously,
since a malicious joke causes enmity and revenge (75). 17. “Don’t be capriciously
stubborn, agree using reason” (77/209). 18. “Do not pass news [to others],” sim-
ply speaking, no gossiping (81). 19. “Don’t get used to being a ﬂatterer” (84).
20. “Desires and taste change with age” (88/209). 21. “Happy life”: “who lives
in the quietude of the soul, he lives peacefully and happily (92/210).
Teplov’s rules are rather trite and not quite inspiring. It is almost impossible
to see in them an application of his general principle that “Christian theology is
the best Philosophy for human education.” In fact, the rules are almost purged
of religious references except for an isolated advice to consider God as the only
helper. It is interesting and even puzzling that none of Teplov’s rule recommends
maintenance of religious duties: nothing about prayers, church-going, or using
Christ as the ultimate model for human behavior.
Instructions to the son were fairly popular in the eighteenth century.
Tatishchev wrote before his death (1750) An admonition of the dying father to his
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son with strong religious accents; in 1719, Pososhkov wrote a detailed Testament
of the father, a testament for his son in which he presented the ideal of Christian
life; in 1761, appeared a Russian translation of Anne-The´re`se de Lambert, Avis
d’une me`re a` son fils et a` sa fille; and a translation of the ﬁrst three conversations
of a multivolume work, Eustache Le Noble, E´cole du monde, ou, Instruction d’un
pe`re a` un fils. Later in the century came out a translation of a French work,
A guide of the youth or an instruction of the father for the son (1786), Chulkov
wrote his Instruction to my young son entering service (1788), in 1789 appeared
a Russian translation of Christian Fu¨rchtegott Gellert, Lehren eines Vaters fu¨r
seinen Sohn, den er auf die Akademie schickt, Zolotnitskii published his Instruc-
tion to the son (1796), and Bogdanov published his Guide to happiness and well-
being: an instruction of a father to the son an knowing God and himself (1798). In
comparison, Teplov’s Instruction comes out rather bland. And sadly, they did not
bear the fruit Teplov had wished for. There was a serious rift between him and
his son, which only grew with years.10 There may be a good reason for it: Teplov
himself did not seem to be too eager to follow his own precepts and thereby he was
not exactly an exemplary model for his son. In view of one historian, “Gregory
Teploﬀ, the Secretary of the Empress, was a man of low origin, equally low cun-
ning, unscrupulous, unprincipled, a fawning sycophant, of grossly immoral life,
and no integrity, but considerable ability of a certain kind.”11 About his tenure in
the Academy it is stated that “he was, as testiﬁed by testimonies that came to us
about him, highly ambitious, had an inclination to despotism ... and besides he
was generously endowed by nature with cunning and guile.”12 In fact, according
to Teplov’s contemporaries, “only his heart is settled and it is one of the most
perverse that nature has created,” an example of it being Teplov’s participation of
in Catherine II’s coup: “it is not forgotten that he soaked his hands in the blood
of unfortunate Peter III”13; he acted through “ﬂattery and deceit” and “perhaps
Nature never formed a more villainous countenance than that of Teplov or one
whose character was more consonant to his appearance.”14
10 In an unpublished letter to Catherine II, Teplov gave an account of his relations Aleksei,
Wallace L. Daniel, Grigorii Teplov: a statesman at the court of Catherine the Great, Newton-
ville: Oriental Research Partners 1991, pp. 135–138.
11 E. A. Brayley Hodgetts, The life of Catherine the Great of Russia, New York: Brentano’s
1914, p. 183.
12 Петр Пекарский, История Императорской Академии наук в Петербурге, Санкт
Петербург: Императорская Академия наук 1873, vol. 2, p. xxi; multiple conflicts of Teplov
with other memebers of the Academy are abundantly documented by Pekarskii in both volumes
of his work.
13 Sabathier de Cabres, Catherine II: sa court et la Russie en 1772, Berlin: Asher 1862, p. 40.
14 Adelaide Collyer (ed.), The despatches and correspondence of John, Second Earl of Buck-
inghamshire, Ambassador to the Court of Catherine II. of Russia 1762–1765, New York: Long-
mans, Green and Co. 1900, vol. 1. 60, vol. 2, pp. 127–128.
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Teplov can be commended for his attempt at writing an introductory book
on philosophy, the ﬁrst such attempt undertaken by a Russian author. How-
ever, the result is ﬂat and uninspiring. Teplov vision of philosophy is limited and
very close to scientism. His presentation of the history of philosophy is amateur-
ish, inadequate, and rather insensitive to philosophy as testiﬁed by his attitude to
philosophers of the past. His concepts are unoriginal and discussion of some philo-
sophical problems is subpar. Curiously, the book was published by the Academy
of Sciences which indicates the level of inﬂuence Teplov had in this institution
and rather low scholarly standards. Teplov’s was an important project for the
philosophically barren country; however, the execution of the project did not
contribute much to a philosophical enrichment of the reader.
Summary
In 1751, Grigorii Teplov published his book that he considered to be an
introduction to philosophy for the uninitiated. In the first part, Teplov intro-
duced the reader to the subject of philosophy; however, Teplov concentrated
on philosophy and methodology of science, thereby presenting a rather limited
view of philosophy. In the second part, he presented the history of philoso-
phy showing how inadequate his knowledge of the subject was. In the third
part, he discussed some ontological and epistemological problems when in his
presentation of several philosophical concepts basing his presentation largely
on Wolff.
Key words: Grigorii Teplov, methodology of science, ontology, epistemology,
Wolff
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